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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the implications of endogenous risk for the economic 
value of preventing groundwater contamination. We consider the analytical 
implications of endogenous risk for five key building blocks frequently used 
to structure studies of groundwater valuation: the probability and the 
location of contamination, the exposed population, risk perceptions, and 
intertemporal issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
Groundwater is a valuable, renewable natural resource that, if 
contaminated by economic activities, may be rendered a nonrenewable, unusable, 
and mobile public hazard. Since groundwater contamination is inherently 
uncertain, efficient resource management requires information on how 
individuals react to risky events and their preferences for risk reduction. A 
mechanism to incorporate this information into policy decisions is cost-
benefit analysis. Traditional Cost-benefit analysis, however, invariably 
assumes that the individual's ability to influence risk is predetermined or 
nonexistent. Yet exogenous risk is a restrictive assumption to apply to the 
behavior of someone who is confronted with groundwater contamination. 
Individuals often employ self-protecting activities to reduce the probability 
or severity of an asset loss. In other words, the individual's risks from 
groundwater contamination can be endogenous. 
For example, an individual can privately test for contamination or 
leaching. He may then drill a new well or employ private water-treatment 
systems, including activated carbon filters, reverse osmosis filters, and 
installation of systems which vent water to steam. Other private protection 
mechanisms include use of aerator faucets, non-lead piping, proper disposal of 
household waste, purchasing bottled water, dumping bleach into a well, or 
simply boiling water. These self-protection activities can remove bacteria; 
organics, including fertilizers, solvents, pesticides and herbicides, and 
inorganics such as lead or cadmium. 
This paper explores the implications of endogenous risk for the economic 
value of preventing groundwater contamination. We consider the analytical 
implications of endogenous risk for five key building blocks frequently used 
to structure the groundwater valuation literature: the probability and the 
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location of contamination, the exposed population, risk perceptions, and 
intertemporal issues. In general, we demonstrate that disregard of endogenous 
risk can cause the straightforward, piecemeal application of conventional 
cost-benefit analysis to underestimate the value of groundwater protection, 
potentially leading to a .cumulative loss in groundwater resources. 
Specifically, we argue that the current focus of groundwater pr9tection 
cost-benefit analysis is misdirected since it fails to disentangle private and 
collective contributions to risk reduction. Private risk reduction efforts 
must be accounted for because differences in human capital among individuals 
induce differences in their self-protection productivities (Ehrlich and Becker 
1972). Consequently, individuals with identical preference orderings facing a 
uniform risk will value collective efforts to reduce risk differently 
according to their private marginal productivities at· self-protecting. 
Therefore, in order to establish the true value of preventing groundwater 
contaminat~on, one must consider the value of collective and of private 
reductions in risk. 
In terms of the aforementioned five analytical issues, endogenous risk 
implies that (a) the notion of the value of a statistical life may be 
misleading since it does not account for uniquely individual differences in 
the ability to influenc.e an undesired event; (b) valuation exercises must 
consider not only specific locations but also lotteries over locations, 
because conditional uncertainty as to whether a specific site is at risk 
depends on the protective actions of private individuals; (c) the exposed 
population should not be multiplied by a uniform probability of contamination 
to determine value, but rather each individual's unique probability that 
results from his self-protection behavior must be estimated and only then can 
individuals' probability-weighted valuations appropriately be summed; (d) 
differences in "objective" versus "subjective" risk perceptions may simply be 
due to the perceived private controllability of the risk; and, finally, (e) 
applications of uniform discount rates may be inappropriate because marginal 
rates of time preference will differ due to differences in protection or 
adaptation opportunities. The basic point is that an individual's valuation 
is dependent on his productivity at self-protection, and this must be 
considered prior to any attempt to establish the value of collective efforts 
to protect an environmental resource such as groundwater. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 categorizes groundwater 
contamination episodes. Section 3 develops a proposed framework for ex ante 
analysis based on endogenous risk. The impact of endogenous risk on the five 
analytical issues is explored in Section 4. 
concluding comments. 
Finally,·Section 5 presents the 
CATEGORIZING GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION PROSPECTS AND EPISODES 
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Groundwater contamination episodes can be divided into three categories. 
Category I consists of known, currently existing contamination of a given 
site. The Love Canal fits this category. category II represents prospective 
contamination episodes (now unknown but occurring Or which may occur in the 
future) from existing facilities. Every underground storage tank not now 
known to be leaking is in this category. Category III includes those proposed 
development sites which might introduce groundwater contaminants. This 
category includes an almost uncountable set of possibilities. 
The assessment techniques and requirements for each category differ 
considerably. In the first, the economic issue is one of estimating the 
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benefits and costs of alternative remedial actions in order to determine the 
appropriate responses to a known episode. The third category involves 
decisions about the appropriate degree of protection to be taken in designing 
and locating any future site. For the second category the issues revolve 
around risk attitudes and perceptions and comparisons of prospective costs and 
benefits of avoiding damage. 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR EX ANTE ANALYSIS 
Given strong policy concerns about groundwater contamination, the 
economics literature that deals with it is surprisingly small. The literature 
which does exist deals almost exclusively with existing episodes (Category I) 
and the attendant human health risks. 1 The studies ignore non-life 
threatening health impacts and the anxiety cost of the possible consequences 
of an approaching plume or one that could change direction due to geological 
structure. 2 These studies also ignore the potentially large loss in wealth 
that households may experience if the threat of explosion from petroleum 
products requires evacuation of house and home. 
Most importantly, because they ignore endogenous risk, we believe that 
the analytical economic frameworks that have thus far been applied to studies 
of groundwater contamination are deficient in terms of their usefulness to the 
ex ante design of regulations (Category III) and to the estimation of the ex 
ante benefits of monitoring existing facilities {Category II). In general, 
the existing literature, such as Raucher (1983) and Edwards (1988), assumes 
that the economic agent is helpless when confronted by groundwater 
contamination risks. At best, he is only allowed to expend resources to 
remedy ex post damage~; he supposedly possesses no ability whatsoever to 
anticipate and to modify the potential size of these damages. 
Marshall (1976) shows that exogenous risk requires that an insurance 
(contingent claim) contract exist for every conceivable risk. Because the ex 
post compensation that the contingent claims supply can then maintain the ex 
ante utility level no matter what the realized state of nature, there are no 
differences between ex ante and ex post valuations of risk. However, because 
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the writing and enforcement of contracts is costly, complete contracts rarely, 
if ever, exist: if he is averse to risk, the individual must therefore choose 
ex ante between contractually defining states of nature or making an effort to 
alter them. These endogenous, ex ante contractual and adjustment 
opportunities affect the individual's relative valuatiOns of alternative 
prospective states. 
Psychologists, for example, Perlmuter and Monty (1979) and Stallen 
(1984), concede that individuals perceive that contractual and adjustment 
opportunities allow them to exercise substantial control over uncertain 
events. Though one can always redefine a problem such that the state of 
nature is independent of human actions, the redefinition will frequently be 
economically irrelevant. Consider the probability that bacterial groun.dwater 
contamination will poison a household's drinking water. The likelihood of 
this event can be altered if the householder boils his water. One might 
redefine the state of the world to be independent of the owner's actions by 
thinking in terms of the probability of groundwater contamination. The owner 
may have no control over the likelihood of contamination. However, this 
probability iS not economically relevant. The owner is interested in the 
6 
chance of being made ill and he is able to exercise some control over that 
event. Risk is endogenous. 
Consider a risk averse individual who must decide how much expenditure, 
s, on self-protection to undertake as he confronts the prospect of having some 
valuable personal asset such as his house or his health, h, exposed to 
groundwater contamination,. r. For a particular liability regime, his dilemma 
arises because his prior self-protection expenditures which reduce the 
cumulative probability F(h;.s, r) and the severity and, hence, the costs, 
C{h; s, r), of any ex post damages, will also cause his ex ante personal 
consumption to fall. Because of adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
nonindependence of risks, the individual chooses not to or cannot acquire 
enough market insurance to avoid the dilemma completely." Given his insurance 
purchases and given that his utility is intertemporally separable, we suggest 
that a minimal formulation appropriate to most prospective groundwater 
contamination problems is: 
b 
Max [ f U(M- C(h; s, r) - s, h)dF(h; s, r) ], 
SES a 
( 1) 
where U is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) utility index defined over wealth, 
w = M- C(·) - s, and health, h. Expression (l) says that the individual's 
decision problem is to choose, given a full income, M, and hazard exposures, 
r, that expenditure on self-protection, s, which maximizes his expected 
utility. His probability-weighted utility is a function of his personal 
consumption and health state, where Uw > 0, Un > 0, Uww < 0, and U~ < 0. Sub-
scripts refer to partial derivatives. At considerable cost in notational 
complexity, intertemporal and spatial features can in principle be introduced 
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into (l) by appropriately defining h, s, and r in terms of time and locational 
distributions. 
The probability weights in (1) are represented by a subjective 
cumulative distribution function, F(· ), defined over the minimum, a, and the 
maximum, b, health outcomes that the individual's genetics and developmental 
history allow. Presume that the interval [a,b) is independent of self-
protection. Let F. < 0 and Fr > 0 in the sense of first-degree stochastic 
dominance. Though the individual acting alone may be unable to influence the 
extent of pollution, he uses self-protection to reduce his exposure, thus 
influencing his cumulative distribution, F(· ), of health states. This 
probability distribution of health states is dependent upon self-supplied 
protection, s, from prospective exposures, r. No restrictions need be placed 
on the signs of F,.., F,., and F,r in the immediate neighborhood of the expected 
utility maximizing level of self-protection, s*. 
For any health state that the individual might realize, he selects a 
minimum cast combination of ex post remedial expenditures and health damages. 
His ex ante efforts to protect himself from exposures influence these ex post 
costs, c, such that c, < 0, cr > 0, and c,.. > 0. The signs of C,. and c., have no 
restrictions. The absence of signs for F~r and en reflects the possibili~y 
that these responses depend upon the environmental concentration (quality) of 
contamination as well as the extent to which the individual chooses to self-
protect. 3 
In order to maximize the expected utility index in (1} one must select a 
level of self-protection, s*, such that the first-order condition 
= -E[U C ) + 
w s 
b 




is fulfilled. The second-order sufficiency condition is assumed to hold 
whenever (2} holds. The left-hand side of (2} represents the marginal cost of 
increased self-protection in terms of the utility of foregone wealth or 
consumption. The right-hand side reflects two types of marginal self-
protection benefits: the first term is the severity effect, the direct 
utility effect of enhanced wealth resulting from reduced expected ex post 
costs; the second term is the probability effect, the indirect utility effect 
of a stochastically dominating change in the distribution of health outcomes. 
The indirect effect is derived by integrating by parts the effect of 
self protection upon the F(·} distribution: 
.b 
J U ( · } dF s = 
a 
b fb ur I + (U ch 
s a w 
a 
since F (a; ·) = F (b; ·) = 0. To get a better understanding of the 
s s 
indirect effect, we can decompose the right-hand side of {3) further by 
integrating by parts once more 
b 
J U(· }dF = (U C -s w h a 
( 3} 
( 4} 
~he first term on the right-hand side of (4} is the mean effect and the second 
term is the spread effect, both defined in terms of second-order stochastic 
dominance such that 
b 
f F dh < 0 a s and 
h J Fs(k; · }dk < 0. 
a 
( 5} 
Expressions (3} through (5) imply that self-protection indirectly influences 
the health state lottery by shifting the mean value of h to the right and by 
reducing the variance associated with the distribution of health states. 
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Shogren and crocker (1990a) show that (l) and (2) imply that the 
marginal value of risk reductions can be increasing and that self-protection 
expenditures need not be a lower bound to the value of risk reductions. These 
counterintuitive results can arise whenever there are differences in the 
marginal productivities of probability-reducing self-protection and of 
severity-reducing self-protection. Existing risk reduction valuation studies 
treat the decreasing marginal value of risk reductions and the lower bound 
nature of defensive expenditures as maintained hypotheses, e.g., Smith and 
Desvousges (1987) and Bartik (1988). However, the results in Shogren and 
Crocker (l990a) suggest that in the presence of incomplete contingent claims 
markets, traditional evaluations of the economic consequences of groundwater 
contamination and other forms of environmental risk have neglected plausibly 
large chunks of economic reality. This neglect combines a disregard of 
important private adjustment opportunities and a focus upon ex post states. 
There is some reason to believe that explicit consideration of these factors 
would have substantial impact upon measures of the economic consequences of 
groundwater contamination. For example, Shogren (1990) and Shogren and 
Crocker (1990b) empirically show that if both private and collective 
opportunities exist to reduce risk, a singular focus upon the collective can 
readily understate the total value of the risk reduction by a factor of two or 
more. In succeeding sections, we present some specifics of why the analytical 
basis of the existing literature is excessively narrow when considered in 
terms of ex ante valuation given endogenous risk. 
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ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT 
To illustrate the potential impact of endogenous risk on the cost-
benefit analysis of groundwater contamination, we consider five key analytical 
issues: probability, locational, population, perception, and temporal issues. 
Probability Issues. The literature on the economics of potential 
groundwater contamination assumes that the probability of an undesired state 
of nature is exogenous to the i~dividual. Raucher (-1983) is the seminal 
contribution to the development of an analytical framework for analyzing 
groundwater contamination episodes and the benefits of protecting groundwater. 
integrity. He defines the expected net benefits at a particular site of a 
collective protection policy i, E(NB;) as the expected benefits E(B;) net of 
collective protection costs X;. Thus 
E(NB;) = E(B;) - X,. ( 6) 
Expected benefits are defined as the expected damages E(D) avoided as a result 
of the policy. The expected damages are defined by 
E(D) = p,[p,C, + (1 - p,)C,]. (7) 
In (7), Pc is the probability that a contamination episode will occur at the 
site in the absence of collective policy i, and Pa is the conditional 
pcobability that contamination will be detected and human exposure prevented. 
cr is the cost of the most economically efficient site-specific remedial 
response to the contamination episode and cu is the cost at the site imposed 
by continuing to use the contaminated water. Since continued use is one 
plausible policy response, it follows that Cr $ Cu; that is, economically 
efficient remedi~l responses can be no more expensive than passively 
continuing to use the contaminated water. 
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Cast in the fashion of (6) and (7), this framework portrays a binary 
collective policy choice. If policy i is collectively adopted, no 
contamination or human exposures will occur; if the collective policy is not 
adopted, human exposures will occur. Though Raucher (l986a, 1986b) and 
Edwards (1988) broaden this binary treatment by allowing collective actions to 
induce continuous probability changes, they still have the probability of 
detection and the probability o~ exposure appear as exogenous to the 
individual to whom the benefits of contamination prevention will accrue. 
Main (1986) breaks the costs of detection down into the cost of cleanup 
1 
with detection prior to exposure, eN, and the cost of cleanup subsequent to 
2 
exposure, C . 
r 
The cost of cleanup and human exposure is thus (C2 +C). 
r u 
While this allows Main (1986) to capture the cleanup timing problem, he also 
1 2 2 treats the probabilities of c , c , and (C + c ) as exogenous to the 
r r r u 
individual. 
Raucher (1983, 1986a,b) and Main (1986) presume that benefit-cost 
analysis influences collective efforts to alter detection, contamination, and 
exposure probabilities. Because they treat these probabilities as exogenous 
to the individual, they are able to base their benefit-cost analyses on the 
value of a statistical life, a measure of the cost of a single death weighted 
by a uniform probability of suffering it. 4 However, even though each member 
of a set of individuals may be uniformly exposed to an environmental hazard, 
one cannot easily assume that each person faces the same probability of 
suffering from the undesired state. Individuals may have identical 
preferences. They may nevertheless have very different probabilities of 
realizing the undesired state because they differ in their abilities to self-
protect from exposures to contaminated groundwater. Thu5 the uniform value of 
statistical life or limb approach to benefits determination that Raucher and 
Main suggest ignores the differences in individual risks induced by self-
protection activities. Since these self-protection activities differ with 
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individuals' capital stocks and access to contingent claims markets, complete 
valuation requires consideration of the individual's willingness to pay for 
collective and for private risk reductions. Otherwise, the exclusive focus on 
collective action that Raucher and Main profess will undervalue the protection 
of groundwater resources, leading to economically excessive levels of 
contamination. 
Locational Issues. The Raucher (1983, l986a,b) specification of C, as 
the site-specific, least-cost remedial measure can generate a bias toward 
sacrificing regional groundwater integritye This piecemeal approach fails to 
recognize that for technical or economic reasons the least-cost remedial 
measure may be the collective or the private substitution of another regional 
groundwater source. The source might be moved to the individual; 
alternatively the individual might move to it. The cost of resorting to this 
substitute will clearly depend upon its state of contamination. This mode of 
adaptation implies that neither the benefits of preventing contamination at a 
given regional site nor the costs of remedial actions at this site can be 
evaluated independently of the distribution of groundwater contamination 
throughout the entire regione Consequently, even site-specific valuation 
exercises must be constructed in terms of contamination lotteries defined over 
a set of locations rather than being limited to the specific site. In 
addition, the exercises must consider the individual's ability to influence 
these lotteries and the timing of their outcomes. For example, someone who 
dumps bleach into his well is not only reducing the contamination of his own 
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groundwater supply; he is also enhancing the suitability of this supply as a 
potential substitute source of water for another contaminated site. Failure 
to account for these substitution possibilities will understate the value of 
groundwater protection. 
Population Issues. Raucher (1983) does not refine the cu measure. In 
his applications, he takes c. to be either realized crop yield loss from 
irrigating with contaminated water or realized health damage from drinking the 
contaminated water. 
Schechter (1985a,b) formalizes the health impact by assuming: 
c. = (M,) (L)Pop, ( 8) 
where Mr is the incremental health risk, L is the monetary value of life, and 
Pop is the size of the exposed population. The monetary value of life, L, is 
taken to be the representative individual's maximum w~llingness to pay (WTP) 
for a small increment in safety and is given by Sharefkin et al. (1984} as: 
L = 
U!W) 
(1- M,)U'(W) (9) 
•.-~here W is the individuals' wealth or discounted lifetime income and U(W) is 
the individual's utility function. In this formulation L is the value of a 
''statistical life" rather than one which is individual-specific. Expression 
( 9) also presumes that health is valued only insof·ar as it contributes to 
income, a presumption that individuals not in organized labor markets would 
question. 
The approach in (8) and (9) is also problematic because it treats the 
health risks imposed upon individuals as involuntary. Again, since 
individuals self-protect according to differences in productivity, one cannot 
aggregate over all individuals while ignoring their private abilities to self-
protect. The proper method to aggregate values is to account first for 
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individual probabilit~es, given private protection, and only then to aggregate 
values across the exposed population. 
Perception Issues. As Weinstein and Quinn (1983) argue, a central 
source of difficulty in measuring the economic consequences of risky events is 
the divergence between "objecti.ve" or "scientific" measures of risk and the 
individual's perceptions of such risk. Objective damages are calculated as an 
objective probability of death (usually drawn from the best available natural 
science evidence) times a dollar value for safety (usually drawn from labor 
market studies). In contrast to such ••damages", perceived damages for an 
individual are equal to his perceived (i.e., subjective) probability of death 
from the environmental risk at issue times a perceived val~e of safety. The 
possible difference between these two measures of damages raises a fundamental 
policy problem, although Raucher (1986a,b) dismisses the subjective 
assessments as not relevant to the policy decision. Raucher's position is 
debatable for endogenous risk. The divergence between "objective" and 
''subjective" risk is often due to the individual's perception of 
controllability (Stallen 1984). This implies that self-protection 
opportunities influence subjective risk. In turn, this subjective risk 
determines the individual's chosen self-protection behaviors. It is these 
behaviors that determine his value of safety. Moreover, this further implies 
that the individual's objective probabilities of suffering harm are not 
independent of his subjective probabilities. 
Intertemporal Issues. It is not just the current population but also 
future populations which count in (8). Schechter (1985a,b) acknowledges 
intergenerational equity issues in groundwater contamination. Nevertheless, 
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there are subtle intertemporal issues short of mutations appearing in future 
generations that need to be considered. 
Since groundwater can move slowly, the timing of a contamination episode 
may be separated by years or decades from the original spill if not detected 
early (recall the framework of Main [1986]). Housing developments may 
unknowingly be situated in the path of a contaminan.t plume that started from a 
leak in the past. A cost-benefit calculation that either ignored population 
projections or was based on faulty projections would underestimate the likely 
damages because the housing development was not foreseen and hence not 
included. 
In addition, the outcomes of programs to alter environmental resources· 
are not immediately realized and then abandoned, nor are the alterations 
necessarily permanent. Unless the individual is myopic, it follows that the 
instantaneous expression in (1) must be modified to account for the temporal 
dimensions of his decision problem. In principle, this modification is not 
difficult: one simply redefines (1) as in Hirshleifer (1970) to include time-
state dependent claims rather than just state-dependent claims. 5 Even in the 
absence of complete contingent claims markets which allow the individual to 
arbitrage away any differences between his impatience and the after-tax market 
rate of interest, one might, as in Graham (1981), adjust the riskless rate to 
reflect this absence. In either case, custom first demands separate 
estimation of the relevant surplus (value) measure in each period and then 
application of the appropriate discounting formulae to the resulting stream of 
instantaneous consumer surpluses. The conclusion is an estimate of the 
present value of alternative'time-state dependent claims. 
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However, while using logic similar to our model in (1) through (5), 
Blackerby et al. (1984) show that the custom is incorrect even when utility is 
intertemporally separable. By focusing solely on within-period effects, the 
customary procedure fails to account fully for the individual's opportunities 
to adapt to the effects of a risk-induced compensating income change in a 
particular period. In particular, it does not allow him to intertemporally 
redistribute his consumption and investment activities so as to equalize his 
marginal utility of income across periods. 6 The ind~vidual's implied marginal 
rate of time preference (his discount rate) will obviously depend upon this 
intertemporal redistribution. Le Chatelier effects imply that the customary 
procedure will underestimate the present value of a time stream of 
environmental improvements and overestimate the present·value of undesirable 
changes. 
Given that contingent claims markets are incomplete, that access to 
these markets differs among individuals, and that the individual's marginal 
rate of time preference is endogenous, the oft-debated question of the 
appropriate uniform discount rate across individuals becomes· less significant. 
If consumer sovereignty commands respect, then discounting must be viewed as a 
personal decision based on the individual's marginal productivity at self-
protecting by intertemporal redistributions of his consumption and investment 
activities. Given the endogenous risk phenomenon that this intertemporal 
redistribution implies, it also follows that individuals' valuations of 
protected groundwater should be aggregated only after accounting for each 
individual's private marginal rate of time preference. 7 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The small number of existing studies on the valUe of inhibiting 
groundwater contamination may legitimately be viewed as precise. Precision 
does not guarantee that their value estimates are either accurate or complete. 
Current assessments typically ignore many dimensions of the economic 
consequences of groundwater contamination. In particular, the exis~ing 
literature fails to disentangle the collective and the private provision of 
protection, insurance, and remediation. It thus produces unnecessarily 
restrictive policy-relevant information about the relative importance of 
collective and private influences upon valuation. Inadequate model 
formulations may lead to inaccurate estimates of economic consequences. 
Further, the current assessments fail to include the full set of physical 
consequences associated with groundwater contamination. This implies an 
under-valuation of contamination effects. Future research directed at 
refining and extending some of the model issues and formulations discussed 
here thus seems worthwhile. 
In conclusion, endogenous risk raises the issue of ex ·ante/ex post 
choice in the welfare economics of uncertainty. Standard welfare theory 
aggregates individual preferences to obtain a social welfare function. Under 
uncertainty, the social welfare function can be expressed in terms of the ex 
ante or the ex post state of the world. An ex ante choice implies that the 
welfare function is derived by maximizing individual expected utility (using 
individual perception of risk) and summing across individuals. The ex post 
choice derives a social welfare function by summing individual preferences 
under certainty, and weighting them by the risk perceptions of experts, and 
then summing to obtain maXimum aggregate expected welfare. Hammond (1981) 
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demonstrates that the ex ante and the ex post approaches will be equivalent 
if, and only if, (i) all individuals have the regulator's perception of risk 
and (ii) the social welfare function is a weighted sum of individual utilities 
under certainty. 
A social welfare function should respect individual preferences. 
However, Sandmo (1983) points out that although preferences are usually 
assumed synonymous with "tastes", the regulator might not respect individual 
(mis)perceptions of risk. The regulator must decid~ whether to use individual 
perceptions (ex ante) or use his own perception (ex post) derived from expert 
opinion. 
Suppose experts conclude that a risk from a given environmental state is 
unacceptable, but the public nevertheless chooses to use this environment. 
Does the regulator ban the environment or allow individuals to use their own 
' discretion? The dilemma is to balance the tradeoff between preserving 
individual freedom of choice and maintaining public safety. The regulator may 
be tempted to regulate the risk in his view of the best interest of society. 
Such paternalistic action, however, conflicts with our society's commitment to 
consumer sovereignty--the individual is best able to judge what is in his or 
her own self interest. Even if there is no such conflict, any regulator-
inattention to individuals' abilities to employ discretion (endogenous risk) 
guarantees that his predictions of the economic consequences of his policies 




Edwards (1988) is an exception. Nevertheless, he too treats risk 
as exogenous. 
£1 A reliance on estimates of the value of life often overlooks other 
l/ 
health impacts that occur short of death. As Schechter (1985b) points 
out, individuals·with cancer suffer while still alive and would be 
willing to pay some positive amount to avoid the suffering. There are 
also health effects short of cancer and death that impose losses on 
individuals. Exposure to chlorinated hydrocarbons for example can lead 
to nausea, dizziness, tremors, and blindness. Individuals would be 
willing to pay to avoid these discomforts. 
It is also important to consider nonhealth impacts as well as 
health impacts. For example, a contaminant plume could result in gases 
seeping into housing structures or other buildings creating danger of 
explosion. The effects of these combined health and nonhealth threats 
effectively destroy large parts of individual and social wealth as a 
result of the consequent impacts on property values. 
See Shibata and Winrich (1983) and Oates (1983) for further 
discussion on the impact of defensive expenditures on cost functions. 
In particular, Shibata and Winrich consider three types of cost 
functions which depend on either the scale of abatement or the quality 
of the environmental medium or both. 
1/ This could apply to morbidity effects as well as pure mortality. 
21 Conventional cost-benefit analysis handles intertemporal aspects 
by considering the Present Value (PV) of the stream of Expected Net 
Benefits E(NB) over some relevant time horizon: 
PV 
T E(NB.) ~ 
t 
t' 
t=l ( 1 + r) 
where r is the social rate of discount and T is the relevant time 
horizon. 
Note, that aside from problems of endogenous risk, Harris and 
Wildasin (1985) have shown (in a non-intertemporal setting) that when 
redistribution is not pos.sible between (groups of) agents that the 
condition for social welfare maximization is the maxi-min condition. 
That is, policies should be selected which maximize the welfare of the 
least well-off (groups of) agents. This rule was also invoked by Rawls 
(1971) in his theory of justice. Invoking this criterion requires 
expected net benefits to be equal in all generations. This allocation 
rule is interternporally inconsistent with the above present value 
expression. In the absence of insurance markets for groundwater 
contamination events, it is not possible for future agents to gain 
20 
compensation from those who were responsible for the episode. Harris 
and Wildasin (1985) also show that if complete redistribution is 
possible, then an unweighted sum of benefits should be used. In an 
interternporal context, this implies a zero discount rate. Thus, if the 
groundwater protection policy objective is to produce the outcomes that 
would occur under complete insurability, the time periods should be 
treated equally. This becomes relevant to the groundwater contamination 
insurance scheme being proposed by EPA and some states. 
£1 Blackerby et al.'s (1984) general conclusion is that "there do not 
exist intertemporal preferences for which the sum of discounted 
instantaneous surpluses is an exact measure of welfare change". 
21 As noted by Rosen (1988), considerable research has examined 
intertemporal risk affecting life expectancy where risks are implicitly 
valued at various points in the life cycle. Rosen examines risk 
valuation over the life cycle where self-protection is assumed not to 
exist. This exogenous risk perspective is consistent with the previous 
literature, but not with our argument of endogenous risk. Keen (1990) 
provides some empirical detail on the valuation consequences of 
disregarding intertemporal substitution possibilities. 
REFERENCES 
Bartik, T.J., Evaluating the Benefits of Non-marginal Reductions in Pollution 
Using Information on Defensive Expenditures, J. Env. Econ. Mgmt. 15(1), 
111-127, 1988. 
Blackerby, c., D. Donaldson, and o. Maloney, Consumer's Surplus and Welfare 
Change in a simple Dynamic Economy, Rev. Econ. Stud. 51(2), 171-176, 
1984. 
Edwards, S.F., Option Prices for Groundwater Protection, J. Env. Econ. Mgmt. 
15(4), 475-487, 1988. 
Ehrlich, I., and G. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-
Protection, J. Polit. Ecoh. 80(2), 623-648, 1972. 
Graham, D.A., Cost-Benefit Analysis under Uncertainty, Amer. Econ. Rev. 71(4), 
715-725, 1981. 
Hammond, P. Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty, 
Economica 48, 235-250, 1981. 
Hirshleifer, J., Investment. Interest. and Capital, Prentice-Hall, Princeton, 
NJ, 1970. 
Keen, M., Welfare Analysis and Intertemporal Substitution, J. Publ. Econ. 42, 
47-66, 1990. 
Main, R. s., Comment on "Impacts, 
Contaminated Groundwater: 
429-430, 1986. 
Costs and Techniques for Mitigation of 
A Review," Water Resources Research 21(3), 
Marshall, J., Moral Hazard, Amer. Econ. Rev. 66(4), 880-890, 1976. 
Neumann, J~ von, and 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1947. 
Oates, w., The Regulation o·f Externalities: Efficient Behavior by Sources and 
Victims, Public Finance 38(3), 362-375, 1983. 
Perlmuter, L., and R. Monty, Choice and Perceived Control, L. Erlbaum Assoc., 
Hillsdale, NJ, 1979. 
Raucher, R.s., A Conceptual Framework for Measuring the Benefits of 
Groundwater Protection, Water Resources Research 28(3), 320-326, 1983. 
Raucher, R.s., Regulating Pollution Sources under.a Differential Groundwater 
Protection Strategy, Amer. J. Agric. Econ. 68(4), 1225-1239, 1986a. 
Raucher, R.S., The Benefits and Costs of Policies Related to Groundwater 
Contamination, Land Econ. 62(1), 33-45, 1986b. 
REFERENCES 
Bartik, T.J., Evaluating the Benefits of Non-marginal Reductions in Pollution 
Using Information on Defensive Expenditures, J. Env. Econ. Mgmt. 15(1), 
111-127' 1988. 
Blackerby, c., D. Donaldson, and D. Maloney, Consumer's Surplus and Welfare 
Change in a Simple Dynamic Economy, Rev. Econ. Stud. 51(2), 171-176, 
1984. 
Edwards, S.F., Option Prices for Groundwater Protection, J. Env. Econ. Mgmt. 
15(4), 475-487, 1988. 
Ehrlich, I., and G. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-
Protection, J~ Polit. Ecob. 80(2), 623-648, 1972. 
Graham, O.A., Cost-Benefit Analysis under Uncertainty, Amer. Econ. Rev. 71(4), 
715-725' 1981. 
Hammond, P. Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty, 
Economica 48, 235-250, 1981. 
Hirshleifer, J., Investment. Interest. and Capital, Prentice-Hall, Princeton, 
NJ, 1970. 
Keen, M., Welfare Analysis and Intertemporal Substitution, J. Publ. Econ. 42, 
47-66, 1990. 
Main, R. s., Corrunent on "Impacts, 
contaminated Groundwater: 
429-430, 1986. 
Costs and Techniques for Mitigation of 
A Review, •• Water Resources Research 21 ( 3) , 
Marshall, J., Moral Hazard, Amer. Econ. Rev. 66(4), 880-890, 1976. 
Neumann, J~ von, and o. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1947. 
Oates, w., The Regulation a·f Externalities: Efficient Behavior by Sources and 
Victims, Public Finance 38(3), 362-375, 1983. 
Perlmuter, L., and R. Monty, Choice and Perceived Control, L. Erlbaum Assoc., 
Hillsdale, NJ, 1979. 
Raucher, R.s., A conceptual Framework for Measuring the Benefits of 
Groundwater Protection, Water Resources Research 28(3), 320-326, 1983. 
Raucher, R.s., Regulating Pollution sources under.a Differential Groundwater 
Protection Strategy, Amer. J. Agric. Econ. 68(4), 1225-1239, 1986a. 
Raucher, R.S., The Benefits and Costs of Policies Related to Groundwater 
Contamination, Land Econ. 62(1), 33-45, 1986b. 
Rosen, s. , The Value of Changes in Life Expectancy, J·. Risk Uncertainty 1, 
285-304, 1988. 
Sandmo, A., Ex-Post Welfare Economics and the Theory of Merit Goods, Economica 
. so, 19-33, 1983. 
Schechter, M., Economic Aspects in the Investigation of Groundwater 
Contamination Episodes, Groundwater 31(2), 190-197, 198Sa. 
Schechter, M., An Anatomy of a Groundwater Contamination Episode, J. Env. 
Econ. Mgmt. 12(1), 72-88, 1985b. 
Sharefkin, M., M. Schechter, and A. Kneese, Impacts, Costs and Techniques for 
Mitigation of Contaminated Groundwater: A Review, Water Resources 
Research 19(11), 1771-1783, 1984. 
Shibata, H. and J.s. Winrich, Control of Pollution When the Offended Defend 
Themselves, Economica 50, 425-437, 1983. 
Shogren, J.F., The Impact of Self-Protection and Self-Insurance on Individual 
Response to Risk, J. Risk an~ Uncertainty Forthcoming, 1990. 
Shogren, J.F., and T.O. Crocker, Risk, Self-Protection, and Ex Ante Economic 
Value, J. Env. Econ. Mgmt. Forthcoming, 1990a. 
Shogren, J.F., and T.D. Crocker, Risk Reduction Mechanisms and Risk Valuation: 
An Empirical Study, Working paper, Department of Economics, University 
of Wyoming, 1990b. 
Smith, V.K., and W. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Value of 
Risk Changes, J. Polit. Econ. 95(1), 89-115, 1987. 
Stallen, P., Psychological Aspects of Risks: The Assessment of Threat and 
Control, Technological Risk Assessment, P. Ricci, et al., eds., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984. 
Weinstein, M., and R. Quinn, Psychological Considerations in Valuing Health 
Risk Reductions, Natural Resources J. 21(4), 659-673, 1983. 
